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At the sitting of 12 July 1990 the President of the European Parliament 
announced that he had forwarded the motion for a resolution by Mr Glinne on 
democratization movements in Africa, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of 
Procedure, to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security as the committee 
responsible and to the Committee on Development and Cooperation for its opinion. 
At its meeting of 6 February 1991 the committee decided to draw up a report and 
appointed Mr Robles Piquer rapporteur. 
At its meeting of 28 November 1991 the committee decided to include in its 
report the following motion for a resolution which had been referred to it: . 
83-1074/91; author: Mr Vecchi; subject: the democratization process in the 
Maghreb countries; announced in plenary sitting: 13 September 1991; opinion: 
Committee on Development and Cooperation. 
At its meetings of 3 November and 22 November 1993 of the committee considered 
the draft report and at the latter set the deadline for amendments. 
At the meeting of 26 January 1994, owing to the number of amendments tabled, the 
commit tee applied the procedure pursuant to Rule 150 ( 5) of the Rules of 
Procedure aQd requested the rapporteur to submit a new revised draft report. 
At the meeting of 16 February 1994 the rapporteur submitted his revised text ad 
a deadline for amendments was set. 
At the meeting of 22 March 1994 the committee adopted the resolution by 17 votes 
to 1 with 2 abstentions. 
The following were present for the vote: Cassanmagnago Cerretti, vice-chairman 
and acting chairman; Robles Piquer, rapporteur; Balfe, Canavarro, Cheysson, 
Crampton, Delorozoy, Dillen, Gfrnther, von Haller (for Lenz, pursuant to Rule 
138(2)), Holzfuss, Lalor, Langer, Llorca Vilaplana, Magnani Noya, Onesta, 
Oostlander (for Penders), Pons Gr?u (for Verde i Aldea), Puerta and Sakellariou. 
The opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation is attached to this 
report. 
The report was tabled on 23 March 1994. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A 
MQTION FQR A RESOLUTION 
Resolution on the democratization of Africa 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the motions for resolutions tabled pursuant to Rule 45 of 
the Rules of Procedure by: 
a) Mr Glinne on democratization movements in Africa (BJ-1123/90), 
b) Mr Vecchi on the democratization process in the Maghreb countries 
83-1074/91), 
having regard to Article 5 of the Fourth Lome Convention (15 December 1989) 
on respect for fundamental human rights and liberties (Doe ACP-EEC 2107/90 
of March 1990), 
havi~g regard to the resolution of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly of 31 March 
1993 on democracy, human rights and development in the ACP countries, 
having regard to its resolutions of 12 March 19932 on human rights in the 
worl~ and Community human rights policy for tbe years 1991/92 and 13 July 
1993 on human rights, democracy and development, 
having regard to the resolution on democratization adopted by the ACP~EEC 
Joint Assembly on 7 October 1993 in Brussels, 4 
having regard to the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on a common foreign 
and security policy, with express reference to development cooperation, 
having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure, 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
and the opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation 
(AJ-0170/94), 
A. whereas 53 sovereign states coexist in Africa, which are at times very 
different for geographical, historical, religious, linguistic, ethnic, 
political, economic and social reasons, many of them governed by 
authoritarian regimes that rely on the armed forces and single parties, 
B. mindful of, the desire to change that situation by democratizing its 
political systems - a desire often expressed by the people of Africa at 
frequent personal risk, and which has led to significant progress being made 
on the road to political freedom in a number of African states, 
OJ C 234, 30.8.1993 
2 OJ C 115, 26.4.1993 
3 OJ C 255, 20.9.1993 
4 OJ C 14, 17.1.1994 
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c. whereas the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact 
and Comecon, the defeat of totalitarian ideologies and the end of the East-
West bipolarity have provided African countries with an incentive to seek 
solutions to their socio-economic problems based on liberty and 
participation, 
D. mindful of the difficulty in achieving this desire for democratization 
because of certain economic factors which have an undeniable social impact, 
such as the deterioration of the terms of trade, which is harmful to the 
developing countries, the external debt of these countries (which, in sub-
Sabaran Africa is equivalent to.106' of GDP), the fact that the current GATT 
agreements are weighted against them and the anomalous flow of capital from 
certain countries of the South to certain international financial centres, 
E. mindful of the strength of the autocratic regimes of many countries, which 
ever since their independence have inherited the worst aspects of colonial 
policy, concentrating power in the hands of dictators and single parties 
supported by military and bureaucratic minorities, 
F. whereas greater or lesser progress towards democratic pluralism has, despite 
these obstacles, occurred in various countries, in addition to countries 
with a tradition of democracy, 
G. whereas civil wars, political assassinations and military coups have 
destroyed fledgling peace processes and democratic governments which were 
peacefully installed by popular vote, and whereas other countries are 
grappling with high levels of terrorist activity and are tempted to severely 
restrict civil liberties and impede attempts to establish democracy, 
H. mindful of the support given to that desire for democratization by the 
European Community in the documents cited· above and the basic agreement with 
that support expressed by the African representatives in the ACP-EEC Joint 
Assembly, in particular as regards its negotiations on human rights and 
through steps taken by its Bureau and eo-Presidents, 
I. mindful of the growing demands among many circles of opinion for an in-depth 
examination to be made of the concept of non-intervention, with a view to 
making the public aware of the suffering undergone by many peoples at the 
hands of the autocratic powers referred to above, whilst the international 
community remains indifferent, 
Considers that: 
1. The people and governments of Africa must find appropriate ways of 
establishing legal, democratic institutions based on their history, their 
cultural identity and open participation by the people in decision-making 
processes which must be characterized by the principle of the separation of 
powers; maintains that the peoples of Africa are entitled to fully 
democratic and participatory systems of government; 
2. Economic development and political democracy are closely linked and that 
support for democracy in Africa should also take the form of economic 
instruments for the benefit of its peoples; 
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3. That right is supported by the will of the African people, repeatedly given 
popular expression since the beginning of the present decade because 'the 
forces of liberty and democracy are contagious' (Charter of Arusha, 12 to 
16 February 1990); 
4. Those African peoples which have recently initiated processes of 
democratization in the face of numerous difficulties therefore deserve to 
be congratulated and supported; and the setbacks which have sometimes 
occurred in some of these processes are to be regretted; 
5. As in the rest of the world, democracy will give the people the Power to 
elect their rulers and to reelect or replace them under the protection of 
representative institutions and under the. rule of law; 
6. The primary expression of democracy is the protection of human rights. 
Regional instruments designed to protect human rights in Africa must be 
perfected in order to guarantee personal liberties against the risk of any 
improper or arbitrary state action; 
7. Democracy is a task that requires constant attention; what is essential is 
a guarantee that conventions for the protection of human rights and 
democracy - such as those drawn up by the UN, the ILO, the OAU and the 
Fourth Lome Convention - will be implemented and not just signed; 
8. Human rights are universal and indivisible. Those of a political nature, 
including the freedom of information and speech, cannot be infringed on the 
pretext of defending economic or social rights. However, they can 
undoubtedly be more easily safeguarded by ensuring that basic needs such as 
food, housing, education, medical care and properly-paid employment are met; 
9. Considers that the current international economic system which marginalizes 
the countries of the South is not in accordance with the principles of 
international democracy and that such a situation serves only to aggravate 
the political and economic difficulties of developing countries; 
10. Regrettably, a number of authoritarian regimes in Africa helped to prevent 
acceptance, at the recent Vienna Conference on Human Rights, of the 
objectives set by the Council in its Declaration of 25 May 1993; 
nevertheless, tribute should be paid to the support given by other African 
states to the defence of democracy and human rights; 
11. Specifically African forms of democratic co-existence, which sometimes 
sprang up in villages and tribes, are rooted in their history and cultural 
identity and frequently have a federal or confederal political form, deserve 
to be fully respected. Those democratic forms must evolve and mature so as 
to enable modern democratic institutions (parliament, government, public 
administration, courts) to function smoothly in accordance with the general 
principles of law and the specific traditions and values of each people. 
In order to prevent corruption and manipulation, the essential goal is for 
all citizens, without distinction of race, sex or social class to 
participate freely in the expression of political will within the framework 
of a state governed by the· rule of law and based on the principle of 
separation of powers; 
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12. Democracy may be introduced through direct elections or elections prepared 
for by national conferences. In both cases, those who already hold power 
must be scrupulous in exercising it in order to guarantee that the popular 
will is freely expressed. One way or another, it is also essential that the 
majority emerging from that process in turn guarantees and safeguards the 
rights of political, ethnic, religious or cultural minorities. For all 
concerned, rights go hand in hand with duties; 
13. Democracy admits of various forms of state and government; it always 
requires, however, a spirit of mutual and abiding tolerance of the 
differences that exist within every country. In particular, it is necessary 
to combat racism of any kind without past abuses being us~d to justify 
future abuses or leading to inter-ethnic fighting; 
14. It is necessary to promote, by persevering, the full integration of African 
women into the political action and civil life of democratic states, in 
accordance with the burden which each African country bears and in order to 
prevent the discrimination they frequently suffer; it is. therefore 
satisfactory that their right to vote and stand for election has not been 
questioned in those countries which have initiated processes of 
democratization; 
15. Great importance attaches to the political function of civil society, which 
finds; expression in political parties, local authorities, churches and 
religious groups, trade unions and professional and employers' associations, 
educ~tional centres, many NGOs and in other agents of a social fabric that 
is crucial for the consolidation of democracy; 
16. Any form of entrenched traditionalism, radicalism or fundamentalism as well 
as the confusion of religious creeds and political opinions or the rise of 
extreme nationalism undermines the necessary democratic pluralism and 
threatens basic human rights. When such principles also favour terrorism, 
condemnation of them must be all the more emphatic and unequivocal; 
17. In cases of systematic infringement of human rights and democratic freedoms, 
in Africa as in any other part of the world, the European Union must apply 
firmly and without hesitation the doctrine formulated by the Council, the 
Member States, the Commission, the European Parliament and the ACP-EEC Joint 
Assembly in the documents cited above. To this end, the Commission should 
draw up transparent, homogeneous and non-discriminatory criteria for its 
application. The European Union should cooperate in the adoption and 
application of United Nations decisions aimed at protecting human rights and 
the will of the people; 
18. Funds to assist the democratization of Africa must be increased and be 
incorporated into a coordinated multi-annual policy , that prevents the 
wastage of resources which occurs at present and contributes'to the proper 
monitoring of the use of those resources. The role o·f monitoring falls to 
the Commission, through its services, which must keep the Council and 
Parliament regularly informed; 
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19. The funds to assist the democratization of Africa should be earmarked mainly 
for: 
(a) training in human rights and civil liberties for election administrators 
and inspectors, officials of various organs of sovereign bodies, 
officers in the armed forces and police and members of the judiciary: 
(b) the infrastructure for electoral processes: electoral rolls, campaigns, 
defining constituency boundaries, setting up electoral boards and 
colleges, vote counting, etc.; 
(c) funds for the launching of the institutions that are features of a 
democratic state under the rule of law, especially the houses of 
parliament, the courts of justice and auditprs and the associated 
technical services which are usually lacking in many states that become 
democratic; 
(d) the carrying out of legal studies of a constitutional nature in order 
to consolidate the state under the rule of law; 
(e) the establishment of an independent judiciary subject to the rule of 
law; 
(f) the demobilization of combatants and the rehabilitation of refugees and 
displaced persons; 
(g) the social integration of those who have taken risks in the fight to 
establish democracy, so that they can participate fully in the 
institutions which represent the will of the people; 
(h) the strengthening or creation of media which are truly dedicated ~o 
truth, pluralism and general respect for human rights, the will of the 
people and the protection of minorities. 
20. In serving the cause of African democratization, the European Union will 
always seek to ensure the greatest possible coherence between its own action 
and that of its Member States so that the above objective is served by a 
genuine common foreign and security policy, in which multilateral action 
predominates over the interests which play a part in any bilateral aid; 
21. Within this multilateral framework, particular support should be granted by 
means of specific budget lines to those African countries which have 
achieved a genuine democratic transition, bearing in mind the problems 
associated with a lack of financial liquidity arising from the earlier 
dictatorship; 
22. The European Parliament must reinforce its participation in the democratic 
processes in Africa by increasing its cooperation both bilaterally and 
within the framework of the Lome Conventions and the agreements with the 
Maghreb and Mashreq countries, in the regular revisions of which it wishes 
to be involved; 
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23. In particular, the European Parliament will analyse the benefits obtained 
by the peoples of Africa from the successive Lome conventions, paying 
special attention to the regular revisions carried out by the Joint 
Assembly. In its own conclusions, the European Parliament will seek to make 
that Assembly fully democratically representative and to strengthen the link 
between cooperation and democracy outlined in Article 5 of the said 
Convention; 
24. When the European Union has to suspend its cooperation with governments that 
infringe human rights and hinder democratic life, it will endeavour not to 
cause the African peoples more suffering than that already inflicted upon 
them by internal oppression. It will therefore seek to maintain, and even 
increase, humanitarian aid through independent channels, including local 
NGOs which are in a position to distribute it efficiently; 
25. Corruption, sometimes linked to the export of unlawfully acquired African 
capital, may endanger democratic institutions. In this regard, some 
European States have experienced situations which prevent them from 
lecturing others on matters of ethics. For that very reason, the European 
Union and its Member States must prevent any possible irregularity in the 
use of Community funds earmarked for development and democratization, being 
especially vigilant in ensuring that banking secrecy does not shield the 
exploitation of African capital. In order to prevent subsequent 
disillusionment, the European Union will help the new political parties in 
Africa to profit from European experiences and to remain free of the 
corruption occasionally found in the west; 
26. The lack of popular participation in public affairs makes a crucial 
contribution to the African crisis, as it did, in particular, to the 
economic recession observed during the 1 lost decade 1 of the eighties. 
Without that popular participation it is not possible to build a nation, as 
the Charter of Arusha (12 to 16 February 1990) points out. The European 
Union must encourage such popular participation, including non-governmental 
and decentralized forms .thereof; 
27. The consolidation of African democracy is without a doubt bound up with a 
drastic reduction in military expenditure, which currently exceeds the total 
aid received by African states. Such a reduction will make it possible to 
strengthen the fight against hunger, depopulation and environmental damage 
and improve the living conditions of refugees and displaced persons. 
Developed countries contribute to excessive military spending with their 
sales of arms that often sustain authoritarian governments. One objective 
of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) should therefore be to 
promote the international control of excessive arms sales to Africa, which 
may favour anarchy and despotism, as seen in Somalia; 
28. Although the crisis cannot be an excuse for not introducing democracy, it 
is clear that the latter will become better established - in Africa too -
if it is built on the firm ground of economic development. In view of the 
current worrying tendency for official development aid (ODA) to be reduced, 
the EC will endeavour to maintain its own contribution, with the aim of 
earmarking 0.7% of Community GDP, as well as to compensate for the damage 
caused in Africa by civil or tribal conflicts, corruption or the dictatorial 
abuse of power; 
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29. While bearing in mind that African development must chiefly be brought about 
by the efforts of its inhabitants, the European Union will, nevertheless, 
give them the benefit of its own experiences in order. to help them construct 
sound market-based economic structures which are self-sufficient in food and 
take account of basic social needs. At the same time, it will promote a 
European and world trade policy which favours Africa's incorporation into 
a market which is open to its products and protected against excessive 
downward trends, as attempted by means of systems such as STABEX; 
30. Democracy in Africa will probably promote integration in various supra-
national - continental or sub-regional - forms of unity that will encourage 
states and peoples to come together. The necessary revision of the OAU 
charter could cater for that objective and facilitate integration. While 
being fully conscious of the differences between the two processes, the 
institutions of the European Union should nevertheless set out their own 
experiences if so requested; 
31. The objective importance of Africa for Europe as well as its historic links 
and its geographic proximity mean that the latter must launch a serious and 
sustained initiative within the framework of the common foreign and security 
policy (CFSP) to break the silence surrounding Africa. Africans must not 
become increasingly the orphans of the post-cold war era. The European 
Union must help to ensure that Africa receives fair treatment and that its 
collective voice and that of its democratic peoples and states are respected 
and listened to in the concert of continents and nations; 
32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the 
Commission, the governments of the Member States, the eo-Presidents of the 
ACP-EEC Joint Assembly, the Organization of African Unity and the 
governments of the 53 sovereign states in Africa and their parliaments. 
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B 
:EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
A. SIGNS OF CHANGE 
1. A wind of change is blowing again in Africa. When the British prime 
minister of the day, Harold MacMillan, first used the phrase, it was to make the 
move towards independence of the entire continent and many of the islands and 
archipelagos off its coasts. There are now (including the newly independent 
Eritrea) 53 sovereign countries, very different in many respects, ranging from 
their history to their language or languages, their religious beliefs to their 
poiitical and social structure, their ethnic composition to their method of 
government. They all belong to the Organization of African Unity (OAU); some 
also belong to the Arab League. They have formed various kinds of regional 
groupings, such as the French African Community which uses the CFA franc as its 
common currency, or the Community of West African States, ECOWAS, or the Union 
of the ten countries in Southern Africa which once formed a common front against 
apartheid, the SADDC, or finally the emerging Arab Maghreb Union. There have 
even been outline plans for an African Economic Community. Through these 
organizations and their member states, Africans gradually came to believe, 
particularly in 1990 and 1991, that there was a direct connection between their 
economic needs and their lack of basic freedoms, according to a UN publication 
(1-1). However, it must be recognized, in a spirit of realism, that the new 
wind is blowing against very solid walls: when the last OAU Summit met in Dakar 
in July 1992 it was still possible to point out that 'few of the 29 presidents 
and 10 prime ministers who had come to Senegal were in power as a cons~ence 
of free elections'. In what is supposed to be a worldwide era of democracy, two 
of them represented 'two traditional routes to leadership in post-colonial black 
Africa': one was Captain Strasser who had just led a coup in Sierra Leone at 
the age of 27; the other was the President of Cote d'Ivoire, Mr Houphouet-
Boigny, described as one of the 'veterans of the anti-colonial struggle who have 
led their countries to independence and continued to cling to power, stifling 
the majority of discordant voices for decades'. As if this were not eloquent 
enough, the Summit opened on the day on which the President of Algeria, Mohammed 
Boudiaf, was murdered (1-2). 
2. Independence meant something very important: freedom for the people from 
the colonizing European powers. It was in many cases a peaceful process, even 
when the colonial power succeeded in delaying it or had recourse to formulas 
which failed to catch on, such as the French 'independence within 
interdependence'; on other occasions there was violence, which was particularly 
bloody in the case of Algeria but was also present in the large Portuguese 
possessions. In almost every case forms of cooperation remained open, or were 
reopened afterwards, through various channels between the newly independent 
country and its former metropolis, sometimes of sufficient strength to create 
a new concept, that of 'nee-colonialism'. 
3. With a few honourable exceptions, decolonization has not meant political 
freedom for the majority of citizens of the new African countries. On the 
contra~y: either immediately, or through the trauma of a civil war or overthrow 
of the elected President, the new citizens frequently came to be governed by 
dictators who survived for many years in the enjoyment of unlimited power, and 
in some cases still do so today. It is true that this one-party system was 
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sometimes applied in good faith because 'it obviously meant not only greater 
efficiency but also a way of opposing tribalism' (3-1). Some of these dictators 
merely disguised their ruthless ambitions for power behind the claim that it was 
impossible to apply West~rn formulas to tribal societies which were largely 
illiterate. 
Others claimed to subscribe to a 'revolutionary'· ideology propounded by the 
Soviet Union, with the aid of its satellites and the communist parties which had 
achieved significant popular support in some European democracies. At a later 
stage the intervention of Cuban troops supported by the USSR propped up some of 
these governments in revolutionary garb. In every case the people were deprived 
of any real control over their destiny for many years, whether with the Algerian 
FLN or the South African apartheid system, under the 'left-wing' dictatorship 
of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia or the 'right-wing' leadership of Mobutu 
Sese Seko in Zaire. In sum, the original assessment by an expert introducing 
his study of the subject considered here is very much to the point: 'Since 
Ghana led the way to independence three decades ago,.Africa's experience with 
liberal democracy has not been a happy one' (3-2). In common with this author 
and his co-editors, we take democracy to mean a system which allows peaceful and 
regular competition for power, participation in the selection of political 
leaders and the proper enjoyment of civil and political liberties (3-3), to 
which one might venture to add that the exercise of democracy must include the 
existence of real alternative government, in forms which will offer the citizen 
a range of options and are capable of carrying them out. 
4. Today the prevailing wind favours devolution to the African people of the 
right to decide for themselves; in other words, to elect their own governments 
according to the universal rules of plain democracy, shorn of such qualifying 
adjectives as 'popular' or 'organic' for example, although African nuances may 
always be added: when it comes to democracy 'the African soil is very fertile' 
(4-1). This changing trend may be seen in the OAU itself. A Western observer 
of the African scene over more than 30 years recently described the phenomenon, 
with a certain irony, as follows: 
'The public sessions of the OAU Summit Conference still ring with emptiness. 
In the old days, leader after leader would take the podium to extol the 
virtues of socialism without meaning or understanding it. Now, at Dakar, 
leader after leader took the podium to extol the virtues of democracy 
without meaning or understanding it' (4-2). 
Setting aside the irony, the second eulogy would seem preferable to the first 
for the simple reason that the socialism to which lip-service was then paid was 
synonymous with a single party state and government by dictator, whatever his 
apparent ideology. 
5. It was clearly a speech delivered at La Baule by President Mitterrand in 
June 1990, at the start of one of the traditional Franco-African Summits, which 
prompted the democratizing spirit to propose that aid to the developing 
countries of Africa should tend to support countries willing to develop in that 
direction. By a lucky coincidence, the same day the King of Spain hosted a 
reception in Madrid for the President of Nigeria, General Babangida and 
congratulated him for undertaking to improve the amount of freedom in his highly 
populated country. During this state visit the Nigerian President observed that 
'the Africans are asking for participation and we have got to accept that fact' 
(5-1); a comment at variance with events as this report goes to press. There 
are signs that, in the words of a noted specialist 'the African continent is in 
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a state of ferment' ( S-2) . However, another French commentator on African 
affairs points out that the La Baule speech was countered 16 months later at the 
Francophone Summit in Chaillot when, while repeating the need to make progress 
towards democracy, the French President said 'each country will have complete 
independence to make suitable arrangements at its own convenient pace once the 
direction has been taken' (5-3); particularly as the Librev.ille Summit in 
October 1992, not attended by the French President, concentrated on economic 
problems and produced the statement that 'African democrats .•. now believe they 
have been sold down the river' because the French 'premium' offered in the past 
will be awarded more readily to economic rigour than to enthusiasm for democracy 
(S-4). 
6. A state of ferment, however, can take various forms. And the reaction of 
established authority to the quest for participation in public life may be very 
different from that of the people concerned. There are likely to be as many 
attitudes as there are sovereign states in Africa. Since an earlier document 
has considered the situation in each country (6-1) this explanatory statement 
will rather refer to certain countries which for various reasons are symptomatic 
of the process of change, and of resistance to change. It will then attempt to 
classify the 53 sovereign states (6-2) according to the extent to which they 
have accepted democracy. It will then briefly review the resistance and 
obstacles to democracy and conclude by summarizing the grounds for a cautious 
optimism. 
7. The model for this is BENIN. Lieutenant-Colonel Kerekou had firmly 
supported Marxist-Leninism and the single party, until the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and strong social pressure induced him to call a national conference, 
composed of about 500 representatives of civil society and more than 50 of the 
'politically sensitive'. The Catholic bishops had already launched a reform 
movement by their critical remarks during 1989 and as a result Monsignor Isidore 
de Souza chaired the first conference, which led to a democratic multi-party 
constitution and free elections. In them the President, dictator, democratizing 
spirit and fellow candidate was overthrown by the current President Soglo who, 
most symbolically, turns out to have been an official of the world Bank. 
Obviously Benin's problems have not come to an end, but at least its people have 
acquired the freedom to decide their own fate and the use of their civil and 
civic rights. 
8. ZAIRE provides the counter-model, although other African systems of 
government would do equally well. A repeated failure to respect the most 
elementary human right$ and dismay at official corruption led to the withdrawal 
of substantial Western aid; this no doubt influenced the decision to convene a 
National Conference, the conclusions of which continue to be suppressed or 
denied by the President-dictator. Meanwhile one of the largest and richest 
countries of the continent continues to decline, according to local accounts, 
from civilization to the law of the jungle. Prime Minister Tshisekedi is 
supported by the Conference which is chaired with considerable moral authority 
by Archbishop Monsignor Monsengwo, but his way forward is totally blocked by the 
President backed up by his Pretorian guard, the much feared 'Special 
Presidential Division' (DSP), the only military force with fire power and the 
usual source of abuses of authority. This tragic situation was compounded in 
mid-March 1993 by Mobutu's absurd decision to appoint a second Prime Minister, 
Faustin Birindwa, an action which is doomed in the same way as two similar 
previous actions but will prolong the suffering of the Zairan people. It is 
hard not to agree with a Washington Post editorial ('Mobutu is the problem') or 
a Belgian commentator who has described the Mobutu system as chaos by decree. 
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The serious incidents of January 1993 in which several hundred died, including 
the French Ambassador,. and the Prime Minister took refuge in a diplomatic 
mission, graphically illustrated the general collapse even the minimum of public 
order needed for survival and were an indictment of the free world's deplorable 
passivity in supporting Mobutu and ignoring his abuses when it saw him as an 
ally. The former Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans has gone so far as to 
call for the intervention of the Security Council and the Protection Council 
( 8-1 ) . 
9. The problem of ALGERIA is of another kind, though perhaps even more serious. 
There the interplay is between a disenchanted youthful population with few 
prospects of employment and a world-weary dictatorship which had imposed a 
socialist revolution and one-party state, whose leaders many Algerians believe 
are guilty of blatant self...;enrichment. The road to democracy was opened in 
· 1990, but closed again in early 1992 by a coup cancelling a general election 
whose results favoured the Islamic Front. The coup was supported by the fears 
of those in power, many military leaders and part of the general public at the 
rapid growth of fundamentalism, in this case Sunni Muslims. The dialectic 
between terrorist attacks and repression continues to increase at the gates of 
Europe; the Community looks on with understandable concern but will not venture 
to take a clear stand in favour of the democratic principles that have now been 
suspended or against the worrying phenomenon of religious fanaticism. In these 
circumstances it would be wrong to make reassuring forecasts about the future 
of Algeria, still less about its intentions for democracy. In many eyes a full-
scale civil war will eventually be inevitable. 
1 0. In the extreme south, SOUTH AFRICA is the example of the most radical 
change, no doubt because in this rich country, the potential driving force of 
southern development, there were the greatest contradictions between a democracy 
open only to the white minority and to other minor ethnic groups, and a black 
majority radically deprived of the right to influence the destiny of a nation 
that belongs just as much to them, though neither more nor less. The deep-
seated changes to the political and legal systems introduced by 
President F. w. de Klerk have still not completed the cycle and are encountering 
fierce resistance from the privileged groups of today and the often violent 
impatience of those passed over, but they represent the end of apartheid and 
should open the way to multi-racial government or a system of guarantees for the 
respective min9rities as planned in Namibia. Unfortunately the long negotiating 
process since the release of Nelson Mandela (whose human and political qualities 
deserve every praise) has provoked other conflicts and +esulted in thousands of 
murders, demonstrating the depth of existing divergencies within the black 
community. The elections scheduled for April 1994 should open the way to a 
future in which the unity of the country and the exercise of universal suffrage 
are backed up by a system of checks and balances that will respect the·varied 
nature of South Africa and the right of minorities. This reform process has 
also had favourable repercussions in other African countries, by highlighting 
human rights abuses which were previously hushed up in order to maintain a 
united front against South Africa. The recent report by a Commonwealth expert 
group on South Africa recognizes, in the words of its Secretary-General E. C. 
Anyaoku, that 'since February 1990 important changes have been initiated by 
State President F. w. de Klerk, ' which is considerable praise from such a 
quarter, 'but the path to a truly reformed South Africa remains a tortuous and 
difficult one and many hurdles will have to be crossed' (10-1). The tragic 
events of each succeeding day confirm this point; no less than 7000 people, 
according to government figures (10-2), have lost their lives during this long 
transition period. For now, the great hope remains that the people of South 
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Africa will be better off when they have ceased to· ·be a 'fascinating 
morality play' and have become 'just another country in Africa' (10.3). 
11. To the east, there is the problem of what should not happen: SOMALIA. The 
fall of the dictator Siad Barre after 21 years of absolute power did not lead 
to the desirable national agreement on reconstruction but to a flowering of 
mankind's basest instincts. It is a tragic·situation, perhaps only comparable 
with that of Liberia. In Somalia, all-out civil war within a people united by 
race, language and religion seems to have left some 300 000 dead of starvation 
and has even permitted the de facto independence of the former .British Somalia 
in the north-east of the country. It has been said that Somalia is the worst 
human tragedy on earth; and to Europe's shame, the glimmerings of a negotiated 
solution and an end to the cease-fire only came about after the intervention of 
American troops, followed by UN contingents whose action has drawn attention to 
the difficulties of such peace-keeping missions. 
12. In the west, NIGERIA. The African giant - in terms of its population and 
oil wealth - has taken a singular path towards democracy at the hands of its 
latest in a line of military dictators, the General Babangida referred to 
earlier, who came to power in a bloodless coup in 1985. What is singular is the 
government's creation of two sole parties of the centre-right and centre-left 
respectively. They have broadly similar programmes and are expressly designed 
to overcome within their confines the enormous tribal and.religious tensions 
which have repeatedly frustrated the political participation which the President 
now wants for his approximately 90 million compatriots. The governors of the 
federal states were elected in early 1992; 16 are from the slightly right-wing 
NRC (National Republican Convention) and 14 from the slightly left-wing SDP 
(Social Democratic Party). The ensuing elections to both Chambers gave the SDP 
a slight predominance over the NRC. The National Electoral Commission, however, 
saw fit to cancel the primary elections to select two candidates for the 
President of the Federation, causing further delay. At the time of writing, a 
new President has been elected ... and his election has since been challenged. 
13. For the historical perspective, ETHIOPIA. The fall of the dictator 
Mengistu Haile Mariam and the collapse of his Marxist-Leninist regime was 
considered the best news out of Africa in 1991, the direct result of the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the end of support from the former Soviet bloc. The 
Ethiopian State, as the oldest country in Africa, has suffered a long war 
leading to the triumph of various peripheral armies over the central power; 
this has led in turn to the dismantling of its territory, with the separation 
of Eritrea following the April 1993 referendum, which the Ethiopian leaders have 
accepted, although it has come as a blow to certain major ethnic interest groups 
( 13-1) and is in breach of the principle maintained by the OAU of the 
inviolability of colonial frontiers (13-2). Meanwhile demands are emerging in 
other regions fluctuating between autonomy and independence. Admittedly, in 
very difficult circumstances the new central power has made great efforts to 
establish democratic institutions and these will now have to tackle the poverty 
which they have inherited. 
14. With an eye to the present, ZAMBIA. The clear victory of Frederick Chiluba 
and his Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in 1991 in the presidential and 
general elections was a welcome surprise to outside observers, who admired the 
elegant way in which Or Kenneth Kaunda, who had exercised virtually unlimited 
power since 1964, responded to his compatriots' discontent, respected the result 
and with dignity handed over the presidency to his rival who had gained 80' of 
the vote. A trade union leader who deserves the confidence of his people now 
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faces the difficulties of democracy, including the fact that Zambia has the 
highest per capita foreign debt of the whole of Africa. These difficulties led 
to the declaration of a state of siege in March 1993 ~d the arrest of leaders 
of the old single party on a large of conspiracy. The detainees included 
various sons of former President Kaunda and Zambia broke off relations with Iran 
and Iraq, accusing both of complicity in an intended coup. As in any democratic 
regime people have a freedom to criticize; and certainly more is expected -
including more urgency - from the new political freedom in terms of economic 
improvements. The 'year of disciplin~', ~s President Chiluba has described 
1993, is a year of painful transition towards a market economy, which the new 
government is promoting following the collapse of the previous socialist system. 
15. Looking to the future, NAMIBIA. It is no exaggeration to say that the free 
world has invested great hopes in this country's viability and stability; the 
youngest in Africa, it emerged from the 1990 elections after a long period of 
confrontation between SWAPO guerillas and South African troops. A constitution 
based on a careful system of internal checks and balances gives some ground for 
such optimism, although commentators are already beginning to discern signs of 
disenchantment with the behaviour of the government of President Sam Nujoma. 
One observer, for instance, claiii!S that the linguis~ic variety of citizens whose 
mother tongue is not English but German, Afrikaans or Portuguese is not being 
respected. In an~ case, the consolidation of national unit'y and the democratic 
system, which it may be hoped will succeed in Namibia, will augur well for 
African democracy. 
16. Virtually all the other African countries are variants of the above models. 
In some, civil war is still destroying or threatening hopes for peace. Such are 
the hopes and disappointments in Angola, where a peace negotiated at length 
collapsed in a new explosion of cruelty by both sides ( 16-1 ) , once UNITA had 
rejected the validity of elections it had lost and which international observers 
had considered to be fair. The 20 000 victims of the new Angolan war are 
evidently being used to delay an election process which was in any case 
premature. The process was monitored by only 400 unarmed observers, because 
President Dos Santos feared that to accept more, with arms, would damage his 
sovereignty. Meanwhile the opposition leader Savimbi has shown himself to be 
'lacking in the essential commitment of democracy: a willingness to accept 
defeat' ( 16-2). In MOZAMBIQUE, following the hard-won agreement of August 1992, 
the ceasefire is being maintained and there are grounds for hoping that the 
Angolan example will not be imitated. At any rate things are going slowly; and 
7500 armed UN troops are supervising the demobilization of the FRELIMO and 
RENAMO combatants. These are unfortunately not the only countries under the 
shadow of war. In addition to the tragedy of SOMALIA which has already been 
described, a precarious ceasefire is being maintained in the city state of 
DJIBOUTI; and a long struggle continues between various groups in LIBERIA, 
where a force from neighbouring countries, appalled at the large number of dead, 
injured and refugees from a brutal tribal conflict, are attempting to make 
peace; after what has been going on in Yugoslavia, it is unlikely to prompt 
feelings of European superiority. Something similar, if on a smaller scale, is 
happening in the over-populated RWANDA, in a conflict which is affecting its 
neighbours tl'!rough the mass exodus of refugees at each stage. In these five war 
situations it is impossible to imagine the establishment of a democratic system. 
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17. The only reliable example of democratic stability is offered by such 
countries as BOTSWANA, GAMBIA or MAURITIUS, which are sparsely populated with 
one predominant ethnic group and since independence have maintained an adequate 
system of freedoms and respect for human rights; few African countries may be 
described in the same terms. Some have joined this select group at times, at 
a faltering pace: BENIN and NIGERIA, in the circumstances described above, the 
new island republics of CAP VERDE and SAO TOME and PRINCIPE, the new state of 
NAMIBIA as mentioned, the large and sparsely populated countries of NIGER, MALI 
and MAURITANIA, the intermittent personal dictatorships experienced by GHANA 
between Nkrumah and Rawlings, and even a country of the size of KENYA, which has 
still not fully come to terms with itself. Mention must next be made of two 
recent converts to democracy, the huge island of MADAGASCAR and the mountain 
kingdom of LESOTHO, where a single-party government backed up by military power 
has just been swept away by the civil opposition in free elections. It must be 
hoped that political alternation will be maintained in ZAMBIA and that the 
President of ZIMBABWE, who is governing with an overwhelming majority, will 
increase the narrow margin he has offered to other political initiatives within 
the democratic framework set up by the constitution. In spite of their 
peculiarities this group should be joined by two countries of undoubted 
influence in Africa: SENEGAL, where the legacy of Senghor remains. in its 
characteristic political evolution, a country considered to be 'the most 
democratic of the old African French colonies', following elections won by the 
outgoing President, Abou Diouf, as a result of the abstention of many of the 
urban young and the traditional support of the countryside ( 17-1); and finally, 
MOROCCO, where political parties co-exist with the major powers of the monarchy, 
which is increasingly endeavouring to respect the rights of its subjects and 
whose external image will depend much on the results of the continuing dispute 
over western Sahara. To conclude, two Mediterranean Arab countries should be 
mentioned here: EGYPT and TUNISIA. Both are under serious threat from the 
fundamentalist wave, but for the moment their democracies survive, albeit with 
limitations to which other constitutional countries are at times compelled to 
resort to deal with situations of especial gravity (particularly acute in the 
case of Egypt). 
18. Some African countries are resisting the wind of change with unusual 
persistence. Such is the case of the YAMMAHIRIA of LIBYA, whose founder claims 
to have established a channel for representation of the people - and 
consolidation of his personal power - very different from the concept of 
democracy that we now regard as universal. In addition to the case of Zaire 
mentioned above, the same attitude can be seen in the President-dictator of 
TOGO, in the most recent coup leaders of Sierra Leone, in the enormous 
resistance to change shown - until quite recently - by the President-for-life 
of MALAWI, where terrible violations of human rights have been committed over 
many years; and of course in SUDAN, whose independence has been almost entirely 
governed by two dictators and where democracy is a bad joke. A particular case 
is TANZANIA, where the strong personality of Julius Nyerere continues in his 
successors and a tough one-party state, which maintains some respect for 
(private) dissent. This attitude is sh~red by UGANDA, since its President and 
government believe that the consolidation of peace and economic recovery may 
eventually open the way to pluralism, though it is considered very dangerous at 
present. 
DOC_EN\RR\249\249585 - 17 - PE 204.257/fin. 
19. The remaining African countries are fluctuating in a grey area between 
single-party and multi-party systems, between past or persisting dictatorships 
and democracies sought after with varying degrees of enthusiasm. This ambiguous 
situation applies to ALGERIA, in the circumstances mentioned above, BURKINO 
FASO, BURUNDI, CAMEROON, COMORES, CONGO, COTE D'IVOIRE, CHAD, GABON, GUINEA, 
GUINEA BISSAU, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, SEYCHELLES AND 
SWAZILAND. In CONGO, for instance, it is worrying that six montha after his 
democratic election President Lissouba should have seen fit to dissolve the 
Assembly and, pending new elections has set up a provisional government, without 
cohesion and facing a difficult economic situation, with the apparent result 
that 'to the Congolese, democracy has the frankly bitter taste of 
disillusionment and crisis' (19-1). The situation in BURUNDI deserves special 
mention: it is hesitantly included in this section in view of the changes 
introduced in 1990, when political pluralism was proclaimed and the charter of 
national unity promulgated; but the dominant minority, the Tutsi, are a long 
way from respecting the rights of the Hutu, who have been the victims of 
massacres which have been strangely hushed up both within and outside Africa, 
despite the fact that some 225 000 people, in a country of just over 5 million 
inhabitants, are believed to have been killed for ethnic reasons over the last 
20 years (19-2). These countries in evolution are joined by the cases of South 
Africa and Ethiopia mentioned above, either in view of the unusual nature of 
their future systems or because the systems are still not in place. 
B. OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS 
20. The prospect of calmer waters for the African continent in which greater 
freedom and prosperity may prevail is being obstructed by the dead weight of 
certain dangerous imbalances. The general situation may be likened to a 
contemporary version of the four horsemen of the Apocalypse, who are still at 
large in the grasslands and deserts of Africa. They are paralysing the new 
countries' progress and they largely bear out the comment made 30 years ago by 
Rene Dumont: 'Black Africa has got off to a bad start' (20-1). Although the 
borderline between the two areas is blurred, some obstacles are of a social and 
economic nature while others, of greater interest here, are more clearly 
political. 
I. Underdevelopment 
21. There are various interpretations of the term 'development'. With the aim 
of preventing the sometimes serious and even irreversible damage caused - in 
countries with a different political system - by unlimited development, the term 
is usually qualified today and only 'sustainable development' is recommended, 
belatedly vindicating the now classic first report of the Club of Rome (21-1). 
However, there does not appear to be much doubt that the opposite concept, 
underdevelopment, means poverty, ignorance, sickness, low life expectancy and 
the arbitrary and often general absence of personal freedom. These unwelcome-
features are widespread and permanent in much of the African continent, although 
the situation is not identical in all its sovereign states. Underdevelopment 
is also a relative concept: some countries are less devel~ped than others. 
·comparisons are beginning to be made; thus Africa has recently been compared 
with south-east Asia, with the comments that 'in 1957, Ghana - one of the 
brightest hopes of black Africa - had a higher GNP than South Korea, which is 
today one of the 'four dragons' of Asia while Ghana's GNP is lower than at the 
time of independence'. The writer adds: 'one expects to find that Africa is 
underdeveloped; what is surprising, is the degree of underdevelopment' (21-2). 
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In September 1992 an influential American weekly saw fit to dedicate its cover 
story to nothing less than 'The agony of Africa'. It took the view that 'Africa 
- sub-Saharan Africa, at least, has begun to look like an immense illustration 
of chaos theory, although some hope !s forming on the margins' (21-3). It will 
certainly be difficult to consolidate a system of freedoms in a population 
consisting of empty stomachs and uneducated and unemployed young people. 
22. As a whole, Africa is the poorest regional grouping of all those into which 
the world usually divided. There are some exceptions to this rule, either 
because they possess valuable raw materials as in the case of Libya, or because 
their population is particularly industrious, as in Mauritius, or a combination 
of both factors as in South Africa, although in the first case the wealth is 
largely in the hands of the government and in the last there is an appalling 
difference between racial groups. But these isolated cases cannot obscure the 
fact that only four African countries appear in the first half of the table 
drawn up UNDP in 1992 in its 'Index of human development': they are Mauritius, 
at No. 48, Seychelles at No. 58, South Africa at No. 70 and Libya at No. 74. 
Moreover, with two exceptions - Gabon and Botswana - the other 46 African 
countries are lumped together on the last 70 places on the list (22-1). Almost 
all the data confirm this backwardness: thus the distribution of telephones is 
7 per 1000 Africans, compared with 700 per 1000 inhabitants for an 
industrialized country (22-2). And Parliament has estimated at 320 million the 
number of sub-Saharan people living below the poverty threshold (22-3). 
23. In 1990 the World Bank published its 13th report on poverty. It points out 
that, five years earlier, a third of the population of the developing countries, 
or more than a 1000 million people, were living on the equivalent of 370 dollars 
a year or less, which without doubt means surviving on or close to the poverty 
line, with a particularly high percentage in Africa south of the Sahara and 
southern Asia (23-1). The same had already been said earlier by the UNICEF and 
Brundtland Commission reports. The World Bank itself acknowledged in 1989 that 
African agricultural production was growing at a pace that was only just over 
half the rate of its demographic.growth, which was increasingly disrupting its 
balance of agricultural trade. As J. K. Galbraith has rightly commented, the 
first principle of-any development policy is to 'recognize the primary role in 
early economic life of agriculture and the peasant' (23-2). Such poverty is 
further affected by what is known as 'the deterioration in the terms of trade' 
of which the President of Uganda (and the OAU), Mr Museveni, gave an example in 
plenary in March 1991: 2.2 million sacks of coffee exported by his country is 
1986 produced 400 million dollars; 3.2 million exported three years later 
earned only 150 million dollars (23-3). Obviously, this is connected with the 
rise in coffee production in other parts of the world, which is not offset by 
a proportional rise in consumption. 
24. African poverty is not an isolated phenomenon but affects virtually all the 
Member States. · It is true that it does not affect them all in equal measure: 
four countries - South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria and Egypt - produce a total 
value of goods and services greater than all the other African countries put 
together; and per capita income in 1990 ranged from 5310 dollars in Libya to 
160 in Guinea Bissau (24-1). Overall, however, Afric;::a is contributing a 
declining percentage to world production of goods and services. In 1970 it was 
receiving 17% of world development aid and in 1987, 30%; its contribution to 
world non-oil prod.uction over the same period fell from 7 to 4%, and the 
proportion of total profits obtained by investors in Africa fell dramatically 
from 30.7 to only 2.5% between the 1960s and the 1980s. As a consequence of 
this last statistic foreign investment is heading elsewhere: between 1980 and 
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1990, 43 of the 139 British companies with industrial investments pulled out, 
mostly from Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Kenya; in the latter, only two of the 15 
Japanese countries based there were still in place at the end of the deeade. 
The major changes which have occurred in Europe since 1989 have extended to the 
economic world the notion that we are entering a new phase of 'post-neo-
colonialism' and that 'the African crisis should be left to the international 
financial institutions as a salvage operation, and if that works, fine: if not, 
so be it; the world will hardly notice' (24-2). 
25. The rise in poverty has been influenced by external debt. According to the 
report on the African economic crisis drawn up by the.UN Secretary-General in 
August 1991, at that time Africa as a whole owed other countries 270 000 million 
dollars and was having to make annual interest payments amounting to 21 000 
million. In the countries south of the Sahara the debt had grown from 138 000 
million in 1988 to 161 000 million in 1990; average per capita earnings were 
declining by 1 . 2% per annum throughout the 1980s, which have rightly been called 
the 'lost decade'. In sub-Saharan Africa individual earnings fell from 400 
dollars in 1968 to 340 in 1988. Significantly, the average growth of the world 
economy during that decade reached 3.2% (it was only 2.4 between 1965 and 1980); 
in other words, which means that the decade's problem was that 'international 
growth was distributed very unfairly' (25-1). On the problem of debt Parliament 
stated its views in May 1992 with a special recommendation on the African 
countries (25-2). 
26. An essential factor in African poverty is the position of women, where there 
is more to regret than to welcome. In general, women are the main losers in 
African life, whether in societies based on Islamic traditionalism or those 
south of the Sahara which maintain their original customs. (It is fair to say 
that in this respect the situation is generally more acceptable in Christian 
communities.) Some countries have made progress towards equality; Islamic· 
countries in this category include Tunisia and Libya and the sub-Saharan 
countries including Lesotho and Botswana; but in the bulk of the continent the 
situation is most unsatisfactory. In the large Sahel region women do between 
70 and 90% of the agricultural work, usually without any kind of load-bearing 
or draught animal or even simple barrows, so that they have to carry firewood, 
water and farm produce on their heads. As Dumont has said, they are practically 
slaves, which he adds makes real democracy impossible. Certain essential 
features of this situation are the predominance in many countries of polygamy, 
'by a long way the unfairest and most dangerous form of social injustice' 
(26-1). This submission of women to male domination contributes in no small 
measure to the population explosion in tropical Africa, growing at a rate of 
3.3% a year and likely to double in 22 years, though forecasts are difficult as 
the new Africans. will be better fed and educated. Suffice it to say that the 
100 million inhabitants of tropical Africa at the beginning of the century had 
become 500 million by 1990. With a population of about 650 million that year 
Africa continues to have the highest fertility rate, with 6.4 children per woman 
compared to 2. 3 in China ( 26-2) . This is particularly unfortunate, since 
African women must daily demonstrate their capacity for hard work and self-
sacrifice: it is they who sow and reap the harvest, their proportion of the 
working population, depending on the area, being between 60 and 80%, a figure 
which rises to between 78 and 90% for preparing food and drink and fetching 
drinking water; even in an area which used to seem a m,le preserve such as 
looking after li.vestock, women are estimated to work as much as men (26-3). 
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27. The awareness is growing that women have a decisive contribution to make to 
improving the situation in Africa. For instance, the report drawn up by 
Mrs Schmidbauer for the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly, on the viability of a new 
adjustment policy under Lome IV, does not merely recommend democratization to 
ensure that citizens participate in possibly difficult decisions but also 
recommends women's participation and calls for the influence of women in 
economic and social life to be encouraged (27-1). 
28. One separate but infl~ential reason for its backwardness is perhaps the 
outside world's neglect. Africa takes a very subordinate place on the 
international scene. One commentator has called it a 'forgotten continent' and 
asserted that 'sub-Saharan Africa does not seem to interest either the 
strategists or the investors of the west' (28-1). Not long ago a well-known 
humorist published a map of the continent bearing the expressive phrase 'We are 
nobodies': in other words, we. interest no one (28-2). It is the feeling of no 
longer being courted, as in the case of the countries in the Horn of Africa, 
which were once fought over by the world powers and are of no further interest 
but have become 'the orphans of the post-cold war era': the rest of the world 
treats Africans with indifference (28-3). A recent study on ways of bringing 
about the painful structura~ adjustment required by many national economies 
concludes that the high price demanded 'cannot conceal what is really at stake: 
extricating Africa, the continent outside the real world (sic) from silent 
chaos' ( 28-4). 
29. Disease is a decisive and essential factor in underdevelopment and should 
be regarded as one of the most serious problems facing the people of Africa, 
particularly south of the Sahara. Disease is becoming endemic, if not pandemic, 
in certain cases such as malaria, which have regressed sharply after being 
thought to have been stamped out, to the extent where there are now 97 million 
recorded cases in Africa per year compared with only 9 and 1 million a year in 
Asia and Latin America respectively (29-1). One million people are reckoned to 
die each year in Africa as a result of malaria and at least 140 million are 
affected by bilharzia. The other predominant diseases are tuberculosis, 
cholera, typhus, polio, leprosy - with 4 million sufferers - and now AIDS, that 
terrible plague which according to the WHO will have contaminated 18 million 
Africans by the year 2000, creating between 10 and 15 million orphans south of 
the Sahara (29-2). Such illnesses are obviously more widespread in the harsh 
tropical climates of Central Africa and are closely connected with the general 
conditions in the country concerned, as they are stimulated by. poverty and 
malnutrition; affluence provides the means to fight the disease: in Libya, for 
instance, trachoma, an eye infection prevalent in desert and dusty regions which 
was very· common before the oil industry arrived, has virtually disappeared. The 
governments have done very little to improve the situation during the colonial 
era. 'In 1986-1988, average spending on public health in Africa was 0,9, of 
GNP, a little higher than the 0.6, in 1960 but only a fraction of the 3.3, 
devoted to military spending'. The situation has worsened with the economic 
crisis so that average health spending in sub-Saharan Africa in 1990 was only 
3.5 dollars (29-3). The result is all too clear: life expectancy, which is 77 
in Spain and 78 in Sweden, is 44 in Niger and 47 in Malawi (29-4). The health 
problem affects not only people but also livestock. As well as carrying the 
fatal disease of tripanosomiasis, of which sleeping sickness is a variant, the 
tsetse fly is one of the reasons why man has been unable to use draught animals 
in large parts of Africa, preventing the use of carts and· ploughs for 
agricultural work; and this pest, like the locust, has· still not been wiped 
out. In the UNICEF report for 1990 its Director-General makes what ought not 
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to be an unrealistic proposal: allocating 5 dollars per inhabitant per year to 
providing basic health care for mothers and children throughout the world. Two 
years later the same UN agency has stated that covering the basic needs of all 
the world's children by the year 2000 would cost 'only' 25 000 million dollars 
a year, a figure which former President Carter has described as less than what 
Americans will be spending this year on beer (29-5). Less than a month before, 
he had solemnly signed the Dakar Consensus, the fruit of an international 
conference on helping African children; it contains an admirable programme 
which cannot here be given the attention it deserv~s, except to mention that it 
refers to the agreement reached at the OAU summit in 1990 in the following 
terms: 'The Africa.n countries accept and affirm that they have the main 
responsibility for settling conflicts in Africa'. Obviously one of the 
conflicts to be settled is the low level of education, with all its implications 
for attitudes to co-existence. 
II. Autocracy 
30. The existence of autocracy comes as no great surprise. Although it takes 
various guises, from the most absolute and tyrannical totalitarianism to a less 
rigid or intolerant authoritarian regime, it always means that fundamentally 
power is concentrated, at least for important decisions, in the hands of one 
man. It has ancient roots in Africa, often going back to pre-colonial times; 
and since then 'the colonial empires set an example of authoritarian government' 
(30-1). No doubt it explains why 'except for one or two leaders ..• the 
commitment to liberal democracy was ·of short duration' (30-2). For this reason, 
in the early 1970s, practically all the governments of sub-Saharan Africa were 
in the hands of single-party regimes or military dictatorships. In consequence 
the main political obstacle to democratic evolution is obviously the usurpation 
of power by a person with minority support - whether military or political 
forces, or both - which provides him with physical coercion and a measure of 
persuasion by gaining virtually complete control of the media_. Autocratic 
regimes sometimes give way to reason or their own conviction that, in spite of 
the resources at their disposal, they cannot solve the problems which 
overwhelmed their subjects and which eventually exhaust the dictatorship. Such 
was the case of Benin and of both governments which have agreed to seek a way 
out of their own control of power, often by calling national conferences. 
However, this is not true of those who have resisted change of any kind or have 
called conferences but then refused to implement their decisions, as in the case 
of Zaire and Togo. It should be added that we are a long way from any African 
version of the old 'enlightened despotism', since the exercise of tyranny is 
usually accompanied by the most blatant kind of robbery, by which the tyrant 
- and to a lesser extent, his minions - become an oasis of shameless wealth in 
a desert of poverty. That such a situation exists, cannot be denied; nor can 
it be denied that this colossal injustice can only be remedied by allowing the 
people to express their preference. However, African leaders have not normally 
seen things this way. For example, in December 1986, before anyone had imagined 
the fall of the Berlin Wall or of the African 'walls', the Club of Rome, whose 
freedom of expression is well-known, held a conference in Yaounde. The speech 
of welcome by the President of Cameroon, Paul Biya, listed the 'internal needs' 
of African countries: the quest for self-sufficiency of food supplies, public 
health, education, population control and employment; the President also 
men~ioned the objectives of joint action in Africa: to promote its unity, 
stability, prosperity and integral development. Clearly, the words democracy 
and freedom are conspicuous by their absence; neither appears to have been 
applied to the reality of Africa in the main text reporting on the conference's 
conclusions, which was drawn up largely by the Club of Rome's Secretary-General, 
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Bertrand Schneider ( 30-3). One consequence of tyrannical regimes is usually the 
arms race. According to UN figures, sub-Saharan Africa is one of the regions 
where 'some governments are spending two or three times more on arms than on 
education and health' (30-4). 
31. Any form of personal power that is not freely conferred by the electorate 
·requires justification these days; the pretext has sometimes been a temporary 
measure to solve a serious crisis situation. But in Africa it has too often 
been prolonged, requiring a doctrinal explanation or, to put it more bluntly, 
an invariably subjective justification in objective guise. Some people said as 
long ago as 1947 that power would have to be confined to the 'prepared minority, 
• destined for government', in the words of one of the first Nigerian nationalists 
(31-1). 
The former Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere, wrote in 1966 that the single-
party principle was essentially democratic and a reflection of African culture, 
in which consensus was a firmly established principle (31-2); a notion he has 
recently repeated, asserting that the existence of a single party has never 
prompted him to believe that his country's government was not democratic. The 
First Republic was the method used by Nkrumah to succeed the Bri tish-style 
democracy with which independence began in Ghana, as the first country in 
Africa; his creed was one of ideological mobilization and the call for political 
uniformity, with a muzzled press and restrictions on any activity outside the 
single party, so that it was not surprising when a few years later, 'support for 
the,violent overthrow of Nkrumah's tyranny came from every sector of Ghanaian 
society' (31-3). In general African governments which we consider autocratic 
have treated the single party as their way of comm~ication with society, and 
they have sought further support in the army, the bureaucracy, the security 
service and-control of the media. 
III. Fragmentation 
32. However, the study quoted above emphatically underlines the evils which 
political fragmentation is causing in Africa. In a comment which has 
unfortunately since acquired fresh topicality, Schneider said: 'The main gee-
strategic point about Africa is undoubtedly its Balkanization, fragmented into 
36 sub-Saharan countries with populations of under 10 million, and 12 countries 
with less than 1 million'. Frontiers are generally artificial and are the 
'source of political and even military conflict'. Elsewhere he reviews some of 
the main African peoples whose unity was politically destroyed by the colonial 
frontiers dividing them: the Ew, the Mandingo, the Yoruba, the Sara, the Fang, 
t-he Bakongo, etc. Not only peoples but also natural regions have been broken 
up: 'The countries of northern, central and southern Africa have frontiers 
which have been drawn at variance with the natural frontiers of the African 
relief map' (32-1). Hence the logic of the recommendation put forward by three 
African authors at the end of this document: that the OAU Charter be revised, 
in view of the fact that its current structure 'contains one main failing: the 
total absence of supranationality', in place of which it is at present devoted 
to 'a simple cooperation structure'. The authors do not go into the internal 
political aspects but confine themselves, following the footsteps of the EEC, 
to the economic implications, recommending the establishment of a 'genuine 
integrated and integrating economic authority', which they suggest should 
incorporate not only the Conference of Heads of State and Government but also 
a Pan-African Assembly, a Pan-African Court, an Economic and Social Council, 
special commissions and finally, the granting of new powers to the Secretariat 
and the Council of Ministers. The Euro-Communi ty model is very apparent in this 
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plan, no doubt because - as Schneider points out - the Community is the only 
foreign power which supports African unity, the EEC plays an essen~al role in 
African development aid and the Community example can help to ensur that the 
'myth of the nation-state is reduced to reasonable dimensions' ( 2-2). Of 
course, this will not be easy in a continent beside which the fragmentation of 
the European peoples appears minimal, in view of 'the enormous diversity of 
Africa, with more than 800 distinct ethnic communities speaking 600 languages 
(no dialects)' (32-3). Meanwhile, African commentators are not unreasonably 
drawing attention to the new European tribalism and its contradiction with the 
supranational intentions of the EC (32-4). 
IV. Fanaticism 
33. When it comes to fanaticism history will not allow Europe to cast the first 
stone. But the countries seeking European Union would seem to have renounced 
fanaticism, even paying the to many people high price of agnosticism. This is 
not the case for some African countries, where Islamic fundamentalism finds it 
hard to accept the existence of alternative beliefs, to the point of banning any 
conversion to faiths other than their own and identifying the state doctrinally 
and politically with the Muslim religion. This is a mainly Maghreb phenomenon 
in Africa and appears to have its antecedents in two long-standing culture-
shocks: the first resulting from the 'Reconquista' and the loss of Andalusia 
by Islam in the 15th century; and the second, 19th century colonialism, which 
was regarded as a continuation of the process. This move back to fundamentals 
has its positive side in that it has had 'a wide appeal in a world which seemed 
to have turned away from morality and honest government'; but there is also a 
dark side because 'fundamentalism, as a political movement, rapidly took the 
road of a violent extremism, spurning the traditional tolerance of African 
Islam' (33-1). It is supported in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia, as well as in 
some non-~frican countries, by the 'Afghans', the name given to nationals of 
countries which fought as mujahidin in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union,. 
well equipped and financed by the United States and Saudi Arabia (33-2). Their 
influence is most apparent in Algeria, and it is there that religion is moving 
most strongly into the political domain, with the result that 'the state has 
been eroded from within, to the point where it is no more than a hollow shell' 
(33-3). 
34. The foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 marked the beginning of the 
current period as the 'first movement to cast doubt on the separation between 
religion and politics', a change which has gathered pace since the triumph of 
the Iranian revolution in 1979. The combined effects of the two phenomena are 
apparent in both the Maghreb and Mashreq countries, if to differing extents. 
This is perhaps because governments have to show 'a certain caution in the 
exercise of repression, using a language which takes account of human rights', 
as a result of international pressure, as happened in Iran when President 
Carter's policy in this area softened the impact of the Shah's police. The 
tension between political power and Islamic fundamentalism is increasing daily 
in Egypt, where tourism has been the target of terrorist attacks on the grounds 
that it is a source of corruption; Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, who is one of the 
intellectual leaders of Egyptian fundamentalism (and is also an 'Afghan' , albeit 
on its general staff), in a speech in a New York mosque, justified the attacks 
on policemen and tourists and has helped to strengthen the determination of 
President Mubarak to fight back, in what amounts to a declaration of war (34-1). 
But perhaps the decisive change· took place in Algeria after the revolt in 
October 1988. According to a recent analysis, and just as happened previously 
in Iran, society in Algeria has been 'broken down by the oil economy and 
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modernization' which in the Algerian case 'combined forced industrialization 
with agricultural reform' and led to the emergence of 'a new kind of social 
agent: urban youth'. In addition, Algeria is to a greater extent than Tunisia 
or Morocco 'certainly the country wt.ere the west has penetrated furthest in 
cultural terms and is suffering a much fiercer identity crisis than its 
neighbours' . It must be hoped tha ':: 'the logical development will be an 
agreement between the army and the Fro1t [The Islamic Salvation Front, FIS), as 
a way out of the crisis' (34-2). Mea1while in other countries, such as Chad, 
there is evidence of concern at 'Islamic imperialism' (34-3), in this and other 
cases promoted by Sudan, apparently as an Iranian outpost among African Sunni 
Muslims. Some see things differently from the European viewpoint: it was the 
corruption of the single-party state in the case of Algeria which promoted the 
strength of the mosques; and democracy, even if the mosques win in the polls, 
w~ll be a better remedy than repression (34-4). 
C. INCEN'l'IVES 
35. Fortunately, there is no shortage of incentives to encourage the Africans 
to develop in the direction marked out by the new wind of change. Some of these 
are the product of their own societies and have ancient roots or have emerged 
more recently; others have originated beyond its frontiers and outside the 
continent itself. All of them are helping to ensure that democratic progress 
is particularly strong in most of the countries covered by this report. 
36. The main incentive is the will of the people. Awakening from a long and 
frightened lethargy, many African peoples have risen up against internal 
oppression to claim their right to control their own lives. This was the motive 
for the national conferences of Benin, Congo and Niger, or the ·comments of 
General Babangida quoted above. It is also the reason for change in South 
Africa, the collapse of the Algerian single-party state and of the prolonged 
Madagascar dictatorship, invariably after violent popular revolutions. It was 
people's armies, sometimes mere guerrillas, which overthrew the Ethiopian 
dictatorship or led to the secession of Eritrea. The smaller Portuguese ex-
colonies - Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome, Cap Verde - are peacefully replacing 
dictatorship by pluralism, as has been achieved in countries of very diverse 
origins and often with a complex tribal background such as Ghana, Zambia, Mali 
and Namibia. When it makes itself felt, popular will is unmistakable and 
direct: in Malawi, the chairman of the commission which organized the national 
referendum recently confirmed on the national radio that '63% of the electorate 
have supported a Western-style multi-party system' and rejected the single-party 
government of President Banda (36-1). ' 
37. At times the democratic system is responding to changes which, in the spirit 
of a new age, are gradually being introduced into African society. In this 
connection it may be useful to mention the case of Botswana, to whose stability 
attention has already been drawn. An example of what one analyst has called a 
'paternalist democracy', Botswana has slowly evolved from an indigenous 'highly 
authoritarian' tradition and a class structure which was always 'one of the most 
inegalitarian in Africa'. It has experienced prolonged government by a single 
party - the Botswana Democratic Party, BDP -which gains substantial majorities 
at each election but has also faced a 'multi-party opposition capable of winning 
as much as a third of the vote'. Since these comments were written a little 
over five years ago ( 37-1 ) new elections have enabled democracy to be 
consolidated. The process was encouraged by the tradition in which the chiefs 
of the eight tribes living in what is now Botswana 'called all adult males to 
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an assembly' the kgotla, when the need arose to decide issues of importance. 
The fact that respect for the law is an old tradition has also supported the 
current democratic process. Two further significant points should be added: 
the fact that the BDP 'is perceived by the Bamanguato and the Bakuena tribes as 
·representing their people' and that critics of such long predominance by one 
party are emerging in urban areas, where its rival, the Botswana National Front, 
BNP, is gaining substantial votes from the working class and the more educated 
classes, to the extent where they include at present the mayor of the capital 
and the two seats representing it in the National Assemb~y. Obviously the 
affluence of the population is one of the main foundations of such stability, 
as a recent report points out (37-2), commenting that 'Botswana has the highest 
human development index in Africa' and that natural resources - diamonds, 
copper, nickel, livestock and some industry are generating a per capita GNP 
which had already passed the 2000 dollar mark in 1990. Clearly, 'and 
regrettably, the rest of African does not enjoy the same advantages as the 
Botswanan people. 
38. Foreign action is a strong incentive towards democratization. The decisive 
influence of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the system 
supported by Soviet power has already been mentioned. The end of the Cold War 
following the disintegration of Communism has undoubtedly liberated 
international relations and will continue to cause drpmatic changes; whatever 
the dangers, the change in Africa should be counted among the most positive. 
To consider the practical expression of this new approach, in late 1992 the 
European Community 'suspended payments' -other than humanitarian purposes- to 
Liberia, Malawi, Zaire, Sudan, Somalia, Togo and Equatorial Guinea, either 
because civil war was making it impossible to finance projects from the European 
Development Fund, EDF, or because these governments were not respecting human 
rights or were opposing democratic change. This is a considerable penalty, 
since the Fund increased its spending on the ACP countries (most of which are 
African) from ECU 1234.3 million in 1991 to 2052.2 million in 1992 (38-1). The 
Security Council has followed up its intervention in Somalia by announcing the 
dispatch of 30 000 soldiers and civilians at a cost of 1500 million dollars a 
year, with orders to complete the disarmament of the warring factions, and they 
appear to have agreed on a method and deadline for national elections (38-2), 
although blood is still continuing to be spilt. At almost the same time the OAU 
has shaken off its torpor and reached the conclusion that 'the right to 
intervene takes precedence over national sovereignty in the event of a total 
breakdown of law and order, or where there are clear humanitarian grounds for 
doing so' , for which it intends to set up its ·own peacekeeping force and 
security council on UN lines ( 38-3) . It was high time the OAU took some 
initiative, as its paralysis was becoming conspicuous to Africans,· as some 
opinion polls have shown (38-4). 
39. A particularly influential external stimulus is what is known as 
'conditionality'. Although this term does not normally appear in official 
texts, the idea behind it does. It consists in making certain support, 
particularly financial assistance, subject to proper respect by the recipient 
government for 'fundamental human rights and freedoms', i.e. of the people who 
are compatriots of that government's members, since 'development policy and 
cooperation are closely linked with the respect for and enjoyment of fundamental 
rights'. With these words Article 5 of the Lome Convention took a significant 
step forward, since the idea had previously been relegated to the preamble. Nor 
is it an imprecise definition: it clearly affirms 'all human rights, the 
various categories thereof being indivisible and inter-related, each having its 
own legitimacy: non-discriminatory treatment; fundamental human rights; civil 
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and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights'. As can be seen, 
the list expressly includes political rights, the first of which is the right 
to elect a government. While on the African side the mandate of Lome IV is 
supported by the will of the people, on the European side it is supported by 
such texts as the Declaration on Human Rights of the Community's Foreign 
Ministers (21 July 1986), the Commission communication (25 May 1991), the 
Luxembourg Declaration of the European Council (29 June 1991) and finally the 
Resolution on human rights and development adopted by the Council and the Member 
States on 28 November 1991, a crucial year for the new doctrine. Its third 
paragraph describes development cooperation as having to be designed with a view 
tO I prOmOting - in parallel With eCOnOmiC and SOCial rightS - CiVil and 
political liberties by means of representative democratic rule that is based on 
respect for human rights'. To as:>ist the process the Community proposes 'active 
support' to governments which pu~sue these ends and defines in detail what the 
terms mean; but it also announces its intention to sanction bad government by 
procedures which range from 'confidential or public demarches' to 'suspension 
of cooperation with the States concerned' while taking care in the latter case 
not to penalize the population affected by bad government. The resolution 
concludes by congratulating instances of recent democratic progress and 
admonishing governments to limit military spending. As a natural consequence 
of this resolution, in February 1992 the Council adopted Regulation EEC 443/92 
applying the same principles to developing countries in Latin America and Asia, 
and couched in remarkably strong language. On 21 October 1992 the Commission 
published a communication (SEC(92) 1915 final) giving details of the application 
of the text of 28 November 1991. This document lists Sudan, Zaire and Malawi 
as African countries with which cooperation under Lome IV has not been initiated 
or has been suspended. 
40. No one should imagine that the democratization of Africa has been completed. 
There is still great resistance to the process, at times with armed oppression 
and at times doctrinal opposition. Exceptional evidence of this ideological 
battle is provided in the report on democracy, human rights and development 
which the ACP-EC Joint Assembly entrusted to the Spanish Socialist MEP Josep 
Enrique PONS GRAU, who produced a very balanced and sensible text. However, it· 
was not adopted by the 1992 Luxembourg Assembly; it was adopted, in the. calmer 
atmosphere of the Assembly in Gaborone in March-April 1993, with some 
substantial amendments. By way of illustration of this report, it will suffice 
to quote its affirmat~on (in point 70) that the principle of human rights will 
have to roll back the doctrine of non-interference in internal affairs, which 
has permitted the most appalli·ng violations of freedom and human rights. As 
this report was being completed the UN Conference on Human Rights in Vienna was 
providing dramatic proof of the resistance of some governments, led by China and 
Cuba, to such humanitarian and political progress. A report published on the 
same day as this text was tabled states that 'the countries of the Third World, 
the successors to the non-aligned movement and the last vestiges of real 
socialism, have become major champions of the principle of 'non-interference in 
internal affairs' and claim that human rights are not universal but a function 
of cultural and religious differences' (40-1). These are governments - not 
peoples - who do not believe that 'without democracy, the chances of achieving 
stability are reduced. And without stability, countries have less chance of 
making economic progress' (40-2). It is not surprising that this group should 
include several African countries. But the progress towards democracy which 
Africa has already made encourages hopes that the peoples of that continent, its 
islands and archipelagos are on the way to regaining their rights and basic 
freedoms, and thereby recovering their full dignity as human beings. 
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MOTIQN FOR A RESOLUTIOn 
(83-1123/90) 
on democratization movements in Africa 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
by Mr Glinne 
• 
Tba lqropean Parliament, 
ANNEX I 
A. having regard to the protests by students and civil servants in Gabon, Ivory 
Coast, Niger and Senegal demonstrating against their governments' share of 
responsibility in applying austerity policies, challenging the single party 
and calling for more democracy, · 
B. whereas President Mobutu has announced that 'political pluralism' will be 
established in Zaire, 
c. having regard to the economic and political reforms which have been or are 
btling carried out to varying degrees in Mozambique, Benin, Congo,, Angola and 
Ethiopia, 
1. Welcomes the democratization movements in Africa; 
2. Calls on the Twelve to do their utmost, in compliance with international law 
and Lome IV's commitment to human rights, to encourage current or future 
refor~s aimed at introducing greater democracy into political, social and 
economic life in Africa; 
3. Calls on the industrialized countries to·facilitate the work of reformers, 
in particular by reviewing their debt repayment policy, which has given rise 
to structural adjustment policies harmful to the African nations, whose 
gross national product has dropped from $854 to $565 in the last decade, and 
taking account of austerity policies that are not accompanied by 'social 
safety nets'; 
4. Instructs its committee responsible to prepare a study of the political,. 
economic and social situation in Africa. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTIOn 
(83-1074/91) 
on the democratization process in the Maghreb countries 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
by Mr Vecchi 
Tbe European Parliament, 
Annex II 
A. having regard to the democratization process under way in certain Maghreb 
countries such as Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, 
B. whereas much remains to be done to guarantee genuine democracy, especially 
in Tunisia and Morocco, with regard to freedom of the press and of 
expression, recognition of the opposition's rights, trade union rights, 
etc., 
c. concerned at the agitation by fundamentalist leaders who, through their 
calls to violence, especially in Algeria, are jeopardizing the fragile 
process of democratization under way, 
D. concerned at the economic and social situation in the Maghreb countries, 
1. Calls on the European Community to give its full support to the current 
democratization process and promote the Euro-Arab dialogue; 
2. Stresses the need for the Maghreb countries to be supported in their efforts 
to transform their economies; 
3. Asks that its committee responsible examine the Community's ·role in the 
democratization process in the Maghreb countries. 
DOC_EN\RR\249\249585 .- 33 - PE 204.257/fin./Ann. II 
OPINION 
(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Development and Cooperation 
for the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
Draftsman: Mrs ERNST de la GRAETE 
At its meeting of 30 Jan~ry 1991, the Committee on Development and Cooperation 
appointed Mrs Ernst de la Graete draftsman. 
At its meetings of 24 June and 14 July 1992 it considered the draft opinion. 
At its meeting of 16 October 1992 it unanimously adopted the conclusions as a 
whole. 
The following took part in the vote: Saby, chairman; Belo and Chiabrando, vice-
chairmen; Ernst de la Graete, draftsman; Christiansen (.for Bird), Daly, 
Kostopoulos, McGowan, Pery, Simons, Telkimper, Van Hemeldonck and Verhagen. 
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• 
1 . Intro4uction 
The draftsman first wishes to thank the ACP Ambassadors who have accep~ed her 
requests for information on the subject, and in particular the representatives 
of Benin, Congo, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Since 1989 the wind has changed in Africa. The air breathed there may not yet 
be that of freedom everywhere, but new currents are in evidence throughout. 
Observers agree that this phenomenon has two main causes: 
firstly, the events in Eastern Europe: the fall of the Communist regimes 
has not only shown Africans that it is possible to shake off the yoke of 
dictatorship, even where it is as powerful as that of those regimes, but has 
also altered the relationships of power affecting the countries of the Third 
World. The financial and military support received by many of Africa's 
tyrants from both East and West abruptly disappeared; 
secondly, the economic and social failure of most of the regimes, 
accompanied in some cases by structural adjustment policies, deprived most· 
of their citizens of their previous minimal level of resources, thus 
producing increasing discontent with existing policies. 
2. The course of political change in Africa 
Two points must be made here first: 
firstly, Africa has not always lived under dictatorial regimes: the pre-
colonial regimes were often organized in such a way as to leave substantial 
autonomy to local communities. Kings and emperors confined themselves to 
collecting taxes and providing security ~ithin their territory; 
secondly, formal democracy - the apparatus of elections and multiparty 
systems - does not automatically imply real democracy. Other preconditions 
are also required: freedom of expression and information without the threat 
of punitive measures, education for participation in the decision-making 
process, etc. 
It is not easy to summarize'the democratization process in Africa. The process 
takes many different forms and is not always constant: there is, unfortunately, 
a real risk of relapse, as in the tragic case of Zaire. At the risk of 
considerable simplification, one may identify two main elements in the process 
of change: 
(a) the organization of a national conference: 
The 'active representatives' of the nation, under the aegis of a figure of 
incontrovertible independence (often a church leader), meet for a limited 
period of time for the purpose of non-violent settlement of accounts with 
the old regime and determination of the new rules for the political process 
(a new constitution, procedures for recognizing parties, regulation of 
elections, etc.). 
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In certain French-speaking African countries this stage has not occurred, 
possibly because colonization had gone so far as to intrOduce certain forms 
of political culture. 
(b) the imm&diate intro4uction of a multiparty system: _ 
In certain countries, the stage of a national conference was not considered 
necessary - in some cases because the regime in power preferred to keep 
control over the process of change, as in Rwanda or Cote d' Ivoire. In other 
cases, the existing political forces saw no reason for a conference, as in 
Zambia or Cape Verde, where elections .without a prior conference have led 
to a change of ruling party. 
In Africa as much as everywhere else, there is no one magic formula to guarantee 
the transition to democracy; thus, in Congo, the government, although the 
product of a national conference, appears to be struggling to establish its 
legitimacy. 
3. Human rights; conceptual definitions 
The definitions of human rights laid down in the various international charters 
cover both civil liberties (individual and collective) and social, economic and 
cultural rights. Accordingly, the UN'Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948, the UN Conventions on civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights and the African Charter on Human Rights of 1981 are considered as 
elements of international law. 
The African Charter on Human Rights would appear to authorize a composite notion 
of human rights tending to combine two different conceptions: the Western 
concept of civil and political rights and the concept of social and cultural 
rights associated with the Socialist ·countries. 
3.1. Ciyil rights and individual liberties 
This notion of human rights, as typically put forward in the West, basically 
entails the protection of the individual by the public authorities against all 
forms of oppression. It implies the need to protect the individual's rights to 
life, liberty, diqnity and physical integrity, to a fair trial and to freedom 
of religion, expression and conscience. Respect for human rights, defined on 
this basis, has recently become a precondition insisted on by aid donors for 
African countries in receipt of economic assistance. 
3.2. Collective rights 
The notion of collective rights essentially covers collective freedom of 
expression for various social groups in the ar~s of politics (political 
pluralism and freedom of ~ssociation), religion (freedom of belief) and the 
media (freedom of the press and publication). 
The concept is wide-ranging and also includes the rights of peoples to self-
determination, peace, development, environmental and cultural protection, etc. 
3.3. Social. economic and cultural rights 
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This notion covers the right to work and to a fair wage and the rights to 
education, medical care and an adequate income. 
Most of the post-colonial African states were based on an authoritarian 
political system leaving little room for respect for the above fundamental human 
rights. The African states were conceived and treated as part of the private 
property of their leaders, and the vast majority of the population were left, 
for the last three decades, without a voice in the decision-making process or 
the administration of their countries, whether in the political, economic, 
~ultural or social sphere. 
3.4. Human rights and EC cooperation and development policy 
Since the insertion into the Lome Convention of Article 5,-concerning respect 
for human rights, major advances have been made in the Community's cooperation 
policy vis-a-vis the ACP States. The Community has established that respect for 
human rights is a necessary condition for development in the ACP States. 
The Commission accordingly drew up a document on 'human rights, democracy and 
development cooperation policy', which was adopted by the Council in November 
1991. 
Community aid is thus now conditional on what are considered to be the basic 
civil and political liberties linked to the criteria of democracy and 
effectiveness of economic mechanisms. Respect for civil and political liberties 
obviously represents a positive step towards respect for human righ,ts as a 
whole; nonetheless, it is to be regretted that respect for social and economic 
rights has not been taken into account when it comes to defining human rights 
violations. 
It should also be remembered that the existing unjust international economic 
system contributes to deteriorating respect for human rights. 
4. Democracy 
Democracy and respect for human rights are two intrinsically related concepts. 
The ability of citizens to exercise the whole range of human rights, including 
social and economic, cultural, civil and political rights, is a crucial 
yardstick for assessing the degree of democracy of a regime. A state cannot 
legitimately call itself democratic if it admits only some of those rights 
for instance, if it permits free elections while failing to guarantee its 
citizens a minimum level of social and economic rights. One cannot talk of 
respect for human rights unless the fundamental rights of citizens, such as the 
right to food, lodging, medical care and education are guaranteed; this.is a 
vital prerequisite for economic and social development in Africa. To say this 
is of course not to justify human rights violations on the pretext of a supposed 
need for a 'strong state' to ensure economic development. 
4.1. Political democracy 
A political system may be called democratic where it is based on a set of ground 
rules accepted by the majority of the population or their representatives and 
where those rules are respected both by those in power and by the opposition. 
After indepe,ndence in the 1960s, almost all the African countries opted for a 
political system based on a single party and with no time limit on the mandate 
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of government. This choice was justified in terms of the need to promote 
national unity, safeguard territorial integrity and stamp out tribalism. In 
most cases, the result was dictatorship and a reign of terror; instead of 
government based on democratic alternation, countries underwent a string of 
military coups. 
(a) Multiparty democracy 
Multiparty democracy, as an expression of political pluralism, c~ certainly 
guarantee changes of government; it does not follow that it will also 
deliver development and economic prosperity. This depends on the nature of 
the regime in power, the political choices made respecting development, 
international relations, etc. Multiparty democracy is not a synonym for 
either ~conomic ·democracy or social justice. One need only recall the 
poverty afflicting the vast majority of the population of Brazil, in a 
country which is actually rich and has a multiparty system. 
(b) pemocratic control 
In the West, democratic control is based on the separation of powers: there 
is the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. In addition to those 
organs, a major role in the exercise of demo,cratic control is played br the 
media. 
Although tne African post-colonial states have adopted constitutions-based 
on the models of the former .colonial powers, the various constitutional 
provisions have remained a dead letter in most countries. Presidential and 
parliamentary elections have been conducted on the basis of a one-party 
system and in the absence of democratic rights, above all freedom of 
expression; this has emptied the system of any democratic content. 
4.2. Economic democracy 
The North-South gap is continually widening, especially in the case of Africa. 
After independence, most African countries decided on an export-oriented 
economic system, without, however, any genuine participation in international 
decisions on raw material prices. 
The Western insistence, which is becoming ever stronger, on tying aid to respect 
for human rights and political liberties contains at least two internal 
contradictions. On the one hand, the aid donors· now require that African 
countries should introduce political democracy; on the other hand, they impose 
draconian conditions for the granting of aid, as in the case of the structural 
adjustment programmes. 
5~ Democracy and human rights: universal or Western concepts? 
(a) Universal concepts as to the substance 
While it is true that the term 'democracy' is today associated with Western 
political systems, it does not follow that all non-Western societies 
necessarily had or have totalitarian systems. In fact, apart from the 
different forms which the application of the concept of democracy may take, 
examination reveals the existence of elements of democracy in traditional 
African societies. 
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The inalienable basic principles of democracy and respect for human rights 
thus belong to the universal sphere; this applies to fundamental personal 
rights, civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. 
(b) The question of specific form 
The great problem in Africa is that the African countries have never tried 
to build democracy on a realistic basis, on the foundations of the 
traditional institutions available to them. They have yielded in the past 
to the easy option of imitation, and this is still the case. None of the 
major existing democracies has copied someone else's system en bloc; the 
systems adopted, whatever their nature, have reflected the national 
character and history of the countries concerned. Thus the UK has adopted 
a constitutional monarchy, France a unitary presidential system, the US a 
federal presidential system, etc. 
It is ~ssential that the African countries learn the necessary lessons from 
the failure of imitation of the Western development model and create 
formulae for democratic political institutions based on their own history 
and cultural identity. 
6. Multiparty democracy and ethnic and regional questions 
The present painful experiences in Europe, in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet 
Union, demonstrate that it is impossible to take the lid off the pressure cooker 
of twenty years of dictatorship without disruptive consequences. This should 
remind Europeans of the need for prudence when taking on the role of 
instructors. 
One of the anxieties expressed by certain African leaders when the question of 
multiparty democracy is raised is precisely that of the resurgence of 'tribal', 
ethnic or regional interests running counter to national development. Such 
fears are not groundless: the dictatorial regimes have frequently been based 
on the promotion of one particular ethnic group or region at the expense of 
others. It is thus perfectly logical that the excluded groups should claim 
thei·r due. Democracy is not the cause of tensions, but it brings to light those 
already in existence; the vital need is to find ways of managing those tensions. 
Federalism is one possible approach: on this basis the African nations would 
return to their old traditions, creating a system with a unitary state but 
substantial decentralization of powers. 
In other cases, the artificial character of the post-colonial frontiers may 
require more radical solutions including independence. It would, however, be 
a mistake to suppose that the creation of monoethnic or monocultural units is 
a solution in itself: it would be physically impossible in most instances, 
while the unfortunate case of Somalia, a country of a high degree of homogeneity 
in those aspects, speaks for itself. 
7. Democracy and development 
. For thirty years development cooperation policy was based exclusively on 
economic growth. There has been a double questioning of this approach in the 
last few years; It is clear from the recent work of the UNDP that development 
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is no longer measured today in terms of economic growth rates; a series of 
indicators of human development is now also taken into account. 
Whereas the orthodoxy for more than three decades was that in Africa economic 
development was a precondition for the introduction of democracy, the present 
tendency is, rather, to consider democracy as the 'miracle solution' which will 
permit economic take-off in Africa. It may be noted in this context that only 
countries operating Western-style democratic systems and free-market economic 
policies are now considered eligible for development aid. 
The least that can be said is that the link between democracy and development 
is far from evident. If one examines the history of countries which have 
successfully achieved economic growth, it becomes clear that there is no 
necessary link betwee~ economic success and the nature of the political regime. 
Singapore, Indonesia and Morocco are far from being models of democracy, any 
more than Germany under Bismarck or Italy under Mussolini. 
While it may seem self-evident that the Community should require its partners 
to respect fundamental human rights and freedom of expression, in politics as 
in other fields, it remains the case that this requirement should be made out 
of human solidarity and not with a view-to selecting the beneficiaries of a 
parsimonious aid system. 
The democratic condition should replace the economic condition, rather than 
being added to it; this is essential as aid will th4s be granted on the basis 
of fundamental values rather than European political or economic interests. 
8. The difficult transition to democratic societies in Africa: contrasting 
experiences 
Following the end of the cold,war and the advent of political pluralism in 
Eastern Europe, Africa is now entering an era of multiparty democracy and free 
elections. However, in Africa as in Eastern Europe, the transition from a one-
party regime to a pluralist and democratic society is proving difficult. The 
obstacles confronting the African countries include the absence of prior 
democratic experience, economic problems aggravated by the current drought, ana 
the revival of extreme nationalism. 
The political transformation of the African countries is continuing, for better 
or worse according to the case. Certainly, some countries, such as Senegal, 
Mauritius and Botswana had developed democratic practices well before the events 
of the last few years. For the other countries, the scenarios adopted with a 
view to achieving a multiparty system and free elections have been highly 
diverse. By way of example, and to illusttate this diversity, the experience 
of several African countries is summarized below. 
1. The 'gentle' transitions 
Caoe Verde: Following independence in 1975, the leaders of this country -
veterans of ·the anti-colonial struggle - adopted a one-party system based on 
Marxist ideology. After 16 years in power, .it was the African Party for the 
Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) itself which introduced 
political pluralism in 1990, abandoning its monopoly on power. 
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The media subsequently discovered freedom of expression; new political parties 
emerged and legislative and presidential elections were held, in January and 
February 1991 respectively. Both elections were won by the newly-formed 
Movement for Democracy (MPD). The verdict of the electors was accepted by both 
winners and losers; the transition to democracy was achieved without violence. 
linin: The church in Benin has been a catalyst for change. As ~arly as 1989, 
the bishops sparked off a protest movement against the Marxist-Leninist Kerekou 
regime, denouncing corruption, nepotism and other abuses. 
The regime, weakened by the country's economic collapse, was obliged to bow 
before the protests, and agreed to hold a national conference to resolve the 
crisis. In 1990, Mgr Isidore de Souza chaired the first national conference to 
be held in Africa; following this, legislative and presidential elections were 
held. 
During.the transitional period- which lasted only one year- a government of 
technocrats, answerable to the national conference, was formed to handle current 
business. A new constitution was meanwhile adopted by referendum. To prevent 
the rise of extreme nationalism, a charter for political parties, outlawing the 
formation of ethnic or religious parties, was formally adopted by the national 
conference. The electoral law requires that parties contesting national 
elections should be national in character. 
These constitutional provisions formed the basis for the 1991 legislative and 
presidential elections. The outgoing president was defeated by his prime 
minister, Mr Nicephore Sogolo, who obtained 68% of the vote. The democratic 
change was rewarded by the Club of Paris, which reduced Benin's national debt 
by SO%. 
In addition, the Benin bishops, noting a certain delay in the implantation of 
the democratic institutions, spoke up once more in March 19.92, signing a letter 
calling for greater vigilance and rigour in the democratization process. 
2. Angola: from civil war to a constitutional state? 
Following independence in 1975, Angola was at once plunged into a civil war, 
essentially between the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA -
backed by the USSR and Cuba) and the National Union for the Total Independence 
of Angola (UNITA - supported by south Africa and the US). The MPLA assumed 
power in 1975, but was at no point able to control the entire country. 
The 16-year-long conflict between the MPLA and UNITA was a manifestation of the 
cold war between the then superpowers; the end of the cold war thus brought with 
it the termination of the Angolan civil war. Thanks to mediation by the US, the 
USSR and Portugal, the two sides were able to reach an agreement, based on a 
compromise solution, with a view to establishing peace and initiating a national 
democratization process. 
The peace agreement signed in May 1991 in Estoril (Portugal) envisages a period 
of transition on the following basis: a joint political/military committee 
including representatives of both the MPLA and UNITA is responsible for 
superintending the peace process, while the UN 'blue berets' are responsible for 
ensuring respect for the ceasefire until the planned elections are held in 
September 1992. 
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The two sides are c~rently preparing for the September elec;:tions. The 
electoral law, accepted by all parties, requires that any party wishing to 
contest national elections must prove a membership of at least 3000 and subait 
at least 150 signatures from each of the country's 18 provinces. 
3. South Africa; awaiting the final disappearance of apartheid 
The release, in February 1990, of Mr Nelson Mandela, who for 27 years had 
symbolized the struggle against apartheid, ushered in the democratization 
process in South Africa. Mr Frederik de Klerk, the initiator of the process of 
change, has achieved repeal of the Land Act, the Group Area Act and the 
Population Registration Act, thus opening the way to the total dismantling of 
apartheid. 
The creation of a democratic, multiracial South African state is still, however, 
far from imminent. Of the country's 35m inhabitants, the black majority ~ho 
form 75\ of the population are still denied the vote. The constitution which 
is still in force after over 40 years is clearly discriminatory. The Parliament 
is still organized on a tricameral and ethnically separate basis, with 'white', 
'Coloured' and 'Indian' chambers. Continued inequalities in the areas of wages, 
education, health and pensions confirm the persistence of real, if not formal, 
apartheid. 
To ensure that the political reforms so far introduced cannot be reversed, it 
has become more than ever urgent to revise the constitution and to set up a 
transitional government to prepare elections based on the universal principle 
of one person, one vote. It is this aspect of the reform, however, that is 
proving a stumbling block, in the negotiations between Nelson Mandela's ANC and 
Frederik de Klerk' s National Party. While the two sides agree in principle that 
a multiparty conference should be held, there are several areas of disagreement. 
Firstly, the ANC is demanding the release of all political prisoners before the 
conference is held. Secondly, it is calling for the de Klerk government to make 
a firm commitment to ending the killings in the townships, in which police 
involvement is suspected. Finally, Mandela and de Klerk have sharply differing 
notions of the powers to be granted to the multiparty conference. The ANC 
believes that its role should not include the prepa~ation of a new constitution 
or assumption of the functions of a transitional government; its task should, 
rather, be confined to defining the arrangements for the convocation of an 
elected constituent assembly. In this case, it would be the responsibility of 
the constituent assembly to draw up a new constitution and install a democratic, 
multiracial transitional government. 
4. Somalia; from military dictatorship to anarchy. 
After 22 years of military dictatprship, General Siad Barre was deposed by an 
armed opposition movement in January 1991. His fall represented a change of 
regime, but.this has not led to an era of peace or democratic transition. For 
the last year and a half, Somalia has been submerged by a tribal war which is 
neither inter-ethnic nor ideological in character. All the contending groups 
in the country - the Somali National Movement (SMN), the Somali Patriotic 
Movement (SPM) and the United Somalia Congress (USC) - are essentially tribal. 
The various endeavours to reconcile the factions with a view to forming a 
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transitional government, preparing free elections and creating democratic 
institutions have failed to achieve their goals. 
Somalia has become a 'ghost country': infrastructures no longer exist, anarchy 
ana insecurity reign and hund~eds of thousands of people are struck down by 
famine. Meanwhile, international public opinion has until recently been 
indifferent: Somalia is no longer - in contrast to the cold war period - a 
country of strategic importance, be it in geopolitical or humanitarian terms, 
for the European powers or the us. 
5. Etbiopia; democracy, the winners' priyilege? 
After 17 years of military dictatorship, the collapse of the regime of Mengistu 
Haile Mariam was followed by the seizure of the territory by rebels from Tigre 
and Eritrea. Following the eclipse of the USSR, leaving the US as the sole 
global superpower, the US is now proposing a negotiated settlement for Ethiopia. 
A conference, with us mediation, was accordingly held in London in May 1991. 
The participants comprised the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF - dominated by the Tigre People's Liberation Front), the Eritrean 
People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), other, 
unarmed political organizations were excluded. 
Following this conference, the EPLF formed a provisional government in Asmara, 
while the EPRDF took• power in Addis Ababa. In July 1991 the EPRDF called a 
national conference with carefully selected participants, which adopted a 
'Charter governing the transitional period in Ethiopia'. By comparison with 
other national conferences held in Africa, the Addis Ababa conference was not 
organized in such a way as to deal adequately with the country's problems. 
In the first place, the conference lacked sovereign powers, since it was called 
and chaired by the president of the transitional government himself, who imposed 
his own rules. Secondly, it was called without prior agreement between all the 
political parties and representatives of civil society to define its mandate and 
powers and the criteria for participation. Thirdly, it was closed to a number 
of parties with differing views on the national situation, such as the Coalition 
of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF) and the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE). 
One year after the accession of the EPRDF to power, the situation of Ethiopia 
now seems to be even worse. The OLF, the other main party in the transitional 
government, recently left the coalition, on the grounds of lack of democracy and 
large-scale fraud in the regional elections of 21 June 1992. These elections, 
organized on the basis of the 'Charter', were boycotted by several political and 
ethnic organizations, including the OLF, and the results have been contested. 
The existence of large-scale fraud was confirmed by international observers. 
Far from being committed to peace and democratization, Ethiopia is now on the 
verge of a full-scale civil war. 
9. Conclusions 
The Committee on Development and Cooperation calls on the Committee on External 
Economic Relations to include the following points in its report: 
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1 • COnsiders that democratization in the ·African countries is a long-term 
process taking many forms and that it is not for the Community to impose 
its own model of democracy; at the same time, hopes that certain 
fundamental democratic and human ·rights will be universally applied ·and 
therefore not be violated with impunity; 
2. Considers that it is essential that the African countries find formulae for 
the creation of democratic institutions that are based on their own history 
and cultural identity and explore federal and confederal systems; and that 
the crucial need is for genuine popular participation (by both men and 
women) in the decision-making process, on the basis of a constitutional 
state and the separation of powers; 
3. Takes the view that whatever parties are created must work for the 
harmonious development of democracy; 
4. Considers that the Community must support the democratic process in Africa, 
both through the established methods of economic development aid and 
through measures of support for democratic adjustment; 
S. Considers that it is important for the Community to provide concrete help 
in the development of democracy in Africa, for instance by devising a human 
rights training scheme for those employed in the administration, the 
judiciary and the security forces and by consolidating demqcratic and legal 
institutions; · 
6. Considers that the presence of international observers constitutes a 
guarantee for the correct conduct of elections and calls on Parliament to 
send observation missions whenever possible; 
7. Affirms that access to information, the right to be informed and the 
development of independent media are an essential part of the development 
of the democratic process; 
8. Considers that respect for fundamental human rights and freedom of 
expression is a precondition for all cooperation policies and that any 
serious deterioration in these areas must therefore be penalized, sUbject 
to a warning procedure, by the suspension of cooperation agreements; that 
socio-economic development and respect for human rights are therefore both 
deserving of support; that greater respect for human rights justifies 
greater support for the development process, and vi~e versa; 
9. Considers that the appropriations devoted to support for the 
democratization process in developing countries must accordingly be 
substantially increased; 
10. Considers that decentralized cooperation is an essential means of 
encouraging and consolidating the emergence of new social forces in Africa 
(trade unions, small farmers' associations, farming cooperatives, etc.), 
and should therefore be considered by the Community as a priority; 
11 • Considers that genuinely democratic countries should have control over 
their own economic development and that, where democracy exists together 
with the necessary elements of sound administration (a fair distribution 
of wealth, anti-corruption measures, and respect for freedom, including 
freedom of enterprise), no other type of condition should be imposed; 
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12. Considers that the international economic system, which marginalizes the 
countries of the South, is incompatible with democratic principles and is 
contributing to deteriorating respect for human rights in the developing 
countries; considers that the collapse in raw material prices on the world 
market is continuing to impoverish the developing countries, the GATT 
agreements do little to respond to their development needs, their debt 
burden is stifling them, the financial flow from South to North is greater 
than the aid they receive and the structural adjustment programmes imposed 
by the IMF and the World Bank result in massive redundancies, a fall in 
real income and the numbers in full-time education, and a reduction in 
health care, all of which primarily affect those suffering greatest 
deprivation; 
13. Considers that the democratization of economic relations between North and 
South is a s1ne qua non for lasting development and for respect for human 
rights in the developing countries; 
14. Considers it essential, in assessing respect for human rights, that the 
Commission should provide a clear definition of criteria, means of 
evaluation and penalties, which must be implemented in a flexible, but 
sufficiently fair and open manner; and consequently asks. the Commission to 
follow up its communication on 'human rights, democracy and development 
cooperation policy' by presenting a proposal along these lines to 
Parliament and the Council, stressing that: 
(a) it is only possible to speak of respect for human rights if fundamental 
human needs such as the right to food, housing, education and medical care 
are guaranteed; 
(b) the right to life, the outlawing of torture and judicial guarantees are 
fundamental principles to which exception cannot be made on the pretext of 
'reasons of state'; 
(c) the right to freedom of movement in one's country, to leave it and to 
return, the right to peaceful assembly and association, the right to 
communicate ideas and receive information and the right to monitor human 
rights violations are all essential to the process of democratization; 
(d) the assumption is that, in general, developing countries can be approached 
with a request not to allow their development to be impeded by a high level 
of arms spending; should this prove the case, however, talks would need to 
be held with the country in question to explore ways of cutting arms 
spending; continued development cooperation might be made conditional on 
an agreement being reached; 
(e) where governments fail to provide sufficient guarantees of democratization, 
Community funds should be channelled to elements in civil society which are 
in a position to institute a transitional process. 
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